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After a person chooses between two items, preference for the chosen itemwill increase andpreference for theunchosen itemwill decrease
because of the choicemade. Inotherwords,we tend to justify or rationalize ourpast behavior by changingour attitude. This phenomenon
of choice-induced preference change has been traditionally explained by cognitive dissonance theory. Choosing something that is
disliked or not choosing something that is liked are both cognitively inconsistent and, to reduce this inconsistency, people tend to change
their subsequently stated preference in accordancewith their past choices. Previously, humanneuroimaging studies identified posterior
medial frontal cortex (pMFC) as a key brain region involved in cognitive dissonance. However, it remains unknown whether the pMFC
plays a causal role in inducing preference change after cognitive dissonance. Here, we demonstrate that 25min, 1 Hz repetitive transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation applied over the pMFC significantly reduces choice-induced preference change compared with sham stimula-
tion or control stimulation over a different brain region, demonstrating a causal role for the pMFC.
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Introduction
Contrary to a basic economic view that our behavior is driven by
our preferences, psychological studies have demonstrated that
past behaviors (e.g., making a choice) can also affect our prefer-
ences. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change
has been traditionally demonstrated by the “free-choice para-
digm” (Brehm, 1956) in which individuals are first asked to rate
several items for their preference and thenmake choices between
pairs of equally attractive items (e.g., posters, CDs, etc.) so that
they inevitably have to reject items they may like. When asked to
rate the same items a second time, people typically report in-
creased preference for the items they chose and decreased prefer-
ence for the items they rejected. This phenomenon is usually
explained as an effect of cognitive dissonance. According to cog-
nitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), any inconsistency be-
tween beliefs, preferences, or choices (e.g., not choosing a
preferred item) results in an aversive feeling (cognitive disso-
nance) that in turn motivates people to reconcile the inconsis-
tency (i.e., to justify their past behavior by changing their
preference).
More recently, social cognitive neuroscientists have started to
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive disso-
nance and subsequent preference change and found that a poste-
rior part of medial frontal cortex (pMFC) activates when
individuals detect inconsistency between their attitude and be-
havior (van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010). However, these
neuroimaging results still left it unknown whether the pMFC
activity merely reflects an epiphenomenon of cognitive disso-
nance such as passive emotional reactions to inconsistency or if it
plays a more active role in inducing preference change to resolve
inconsistency.
In the present study, we attempted to answer this question of
causality by using 25 min, 1 Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) to temporarily downregulate neuronal activity
within pMFC todeterminewhether this reduces the cognitive disso-
nance effect. To measure choice-induced preference change, we
used amodified free-choice paradigm using a “choice-blindness”
procedure (Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2012; Hall et al.,
2013; see Materials and Methods for details). This procedure
controls for an important artifact inherent in the original free-
choice paradigm (Chen and Risen, 2010; for review, see Izuma
and Murayama, 2013), thus allowing for a methodologically rig-
orous test of the hypothesis.
Materials andMethods
Participants
A total of 61 individuals participated in the study. One participant de-
cided to withdraw from the study after the TMS procedure was ex-
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plained. Another participant was also withdrawn from the study because
the participant reported feeling dizzy during the motor thresholding
procedure (see below for more details). Seven additional participants
were also excluded from the analyses: four detected our critical switch
manipulation during the choice task (see below for details), two were
excluded due to technical problems with TMS, and one showed a signif-
icantly negative correlation between two preference ratings (first and
second rating tasks described below; r(48)  0.23, which is 3 SDs
below the group average of r 0.48 [SD 0.21]), suggesting very poor
compliance with the task instructions. Accordingly, the final analyses
were based on 52 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of three TMS groups (between-subject design): (1) the pMFC group
(n 17, 8 female, mean age 22.4), (2) the sham-pMFC group (n 17,
7 female, mean age  22.5), or (3) the posterior parietal cortex (PPC)
group (n  18, 8 female, mean age  21.6). There was no significant
difference in age across the three TMS groups (p  0.84). The partici-
pants were all right-handedwith no history of neurological or psychiatric
illness. All participants gave written informed consent for participation
and the study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the
California Institute of Technology.
Stimuli
The experimental stimuli chosen for this experiment were abstract com-
puter desktop images freely available on the Internet (Fig. 1). There were
50 images used in the study, paired up in 25 pairs of similar but distinct
images (the pairs were fixed among all participants). This was done to
allow the switch manipulation used in the choice task to be unde-
tected by participants, but still provide stimuli that could be preferred
differentially.
Experimental tasks
In the present study, we used a modified free-choice paradigm using a
“choice-blindness” procedure (Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2012;
Hall et al., 2013) during the choice task. The procedure (detailed below)
allowed us to address an important methodological flaw in the original
paradigm (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma andMurayama, 2013). Ratings
are not perfect measures of true preference (i.e., there is some “noise” in
ratings). During the choice task of the paradigm, an individual’s choice
reveals additional information about their true preference. Because items
chosen are more likely to have higher true preferences than rejected
items, when measured a second time, chosen items are more likely to be
rated higher than rejected items (i.e., regression toward true preference).
Because the effects of true preference and choice are confounded in such
a manner, the original “free-choice” paradigm could inadvertently mea-
sure preference changewithout the effect of choice on true preference. To
address this methodological issue, we used a modified choice task in our
experimental paradigm in which individuals were occasionally led to
believe that they had chosen the item that they actually preferred less than
the alternative. Therefore, although preference and choice often go to-
gether, our paradigm allows us to dissociate one from the another, which
made it possible to dissociate the effects of choice from the effect of true
preference. Before the current TMS study, we ran a behavioral pilot study
(without TMS; n 26) to verify that we could measure choice-induced
preference change over and above the confound (data not shown). We
also verified that the detection rate of our critical switch manipulation
(see below) was sufficiently low (3 of 26 participants).
In the present study, participants performed the four following tasks in
fixed order: (1) the first rating task, (2) the choice task, (3) the second
rating task, and (4) the memory task. Because our prior fMRI study
demonstrated pMFC activation in response to the discrepancy between
behavior and attitude during the second rating task (Izuma et al., 2010),
the rTMS treatment was administered right before participants per-
formed the second rating tasks (an offline rTMS approach). After com-
pleting the second rating task, all participants took a 35–40minute break
before the memory task to ensure that the effects of TMS had subsided
before continuing.
In the first rating task, participants were presented with images serially
and were instructed to rate how much they liked each image using an
8-point scale where 1  not at all and 8  very much labeled on the
keyboard. There was no time limit, but participants were encouraged to
give their first impression. The intertrial interval was 1 s.
In the choice task, images were presented in pairs and participants
were asked to indicate the image they preferred in each trial using a
computer mouse with their right hand. Therefore, participants made 25
binary choices in total (50 images). There were four experimental condi-
Figure 1. The illustration of a switch trial (a), a no-switch trial (b), and a computer trial (c) during the choice task. During switch and no-switch trials, participants were first instructed to move
the mouse cursor to the box corresponding to the image that they preferred (e.g., a yellow box if they preferred the image on the top). After performing 4 trials of the Flanker task that serves as a
distractor (stage 3), they were asked to click the image on the screen (stage 4; presumably the one they preferred at stage 2). Note that the locations of two images were switched between stages
2 and 4 only during a switch trial so that the participantswere led to believe that they had chosen the image that they actually preferred less than the alternative. Each image of switch andno-switch
trialswas categorized into 1 of the 4 conditions (images A–D) depending on the condition (switch or no-switch) andparticipant’s action during stage 2 (preferred or unpreferred). During a computer
trial, participants were asked to simply pick the image selected by a computer (indicated by red arrows). Each image of computer trials was categorized into either computer-chosen or computer
unchosen conditions (image E or F).
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tions during the choice task: (1) switch trials (five trials), (2) no-switch
trials (five trials), (3) computer trials (five trials), and (4) other trials (10
trials; not included in preference change analysis).
Whereas the 25 pairs were fixed among all participants, which pairs
were used in each of the four conditions (switch, no-switch, computer,
and other) in the choice task was determined based on each participant’s
rating during the first rating task. Before the choice task, 15 image pairs
(30 images) used in the switch, no-switch, and computer trials were
automaticallymatched by aMATLAB program in terms of the difference
in the first ratings between two images in each pair. As discussed previ-
ously (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma andMurayama, 2013), the strength
of the artifact in the traditional free-choice paradigm depends on the
rating difference between two images in a choice pair (i.e., the smaller
the within-pair rating difference, the bigger the preference change by the
artifact). Moreover, pairs with larger difference in the first ratings were
preferentially allocated to the three conditions used in analysis. This was
done to induce stronger cognitive dissonance (i.e., larger discrepancy
between preference and choice) in the switch condition. That is, assum-
ing that participants choose the image from a pair with the higher first
rating most of the time, when their choice is reversed by the switch
manipulation, they would believe that they chose the image they disliked
and did not choose the image they liked. The remaining 20 images were
assigned to the “other” condition and excluded from preference change
analysis because items in the other trials were notmatched onwithin-pair
rating difference. Therefore, the comparisons between the other and the
three critical conditions would not be informative. Although not used in
the analyses, these additional 20 images were necessary to have more
options, from which we chose 15 pairs for the three critical conditions
that were sufficiently matched on the within-pair difference.
In each trial of the switch condition, participants were first asked to
click the “start” button located on the left side of the screen (Fig. 1a, stage
1). As soon as they clicked the button, two images and two boxes (a
yellow box on the top and a blue box on the bottom, both of which were
alignedwith each of two images) appeared on the screen (Fig. 1a, stage 2).
Participants were asked to look at each of the two images carefully and to
move the mouse cursor to the box corresponding to the image they
preferred. For example, if they preferred the image on the top, they
moved the cursor to the yellow box. The two images remained on the
screen until a preference was indicated or for a maximum of 3 s. If the
participants did not decide after 3 s, the 2 images disappeared, and par-
ticipants then had to make their choice from memory.
As soon as the cursor touched one of the two boxes, the screen auto-
matically changed, and participants performed four trials of a flanker
task (Fig. 1a, stage 3), which was intended to distract participants’ mem-
ory for the locations of the two images. During instructions, the choice
task was referred to as the “choice and attention” task and each partici-
pant was told that the task was intended to test decision making and
attention at the same time, providing an explanation for the flanker task.
During the four trials of the flanker task, therewere always two congruent
(“” or “”) and two incongruent (“” or
“”) trials, and participants were asked to answer the direction
of a central target arrow (left or right). Participants responded by press-
ing 1 of 2 keys labeled on the keyboard with their left hand (index and
middle fingers) and were told that they would get 1 point every time they
responded accurately within 1 s. They were encouraged to try to get at
least 60 points (of 100) in total and aim for 80 points if possible. There
was no monetary incentive for the task. Stimuli were presented once
every second (0.5 s for stimulus presentation plus 0.5 s for interstimulus
interval). After 4 trials (4 s), the total points accumulated were displayed
on the screen for 1 s.
After the flanker task (5 s in total), the screen showed only one image,
which was presumably the one they had preferred before the flanker task,
along with the start button and the box touched by the participants (Fig.
1a, stage 4). Finally, participants were instructed to click the image on the
screen (presumably the one they had preferred) and the image was high-
lighted by a light blue square for 1.5 s. Unknown to the participants,
during the switch trials, the locations of two images were switched after
the flanker task so that they were led to believe that they had chosen the
image they actually preferred less than the alternative (i.e., the image that
was not preferred at the stage 2 of the choice task). The switch manipu-
lation always occurred on 5th, 10th, 16th, 20th, and 24th trials. No par-
ticipant reported the switches during the task, but four of them reported
it during the postexperimental interview (see below).
In the no-switch trials (and other trials), the task proceeded in the
same way except that no switch was made (Fig. 1b, stage 4). In the com-
puter trials, the words “Computer’s choice” were displayed above the
start button at the beginning of the trial (Fig. 1c, stage 1). After clicking
the start button, two images and two boxes were displayed on the screen,
just like in the other trials. However, the participants were asked to wait
for a computer to choose one of two images. After 1 s, the computer’s
choice (red arrows) was displayed on the screen (Fig. 1c, stage 2) and the
participants were asked to simply move the cursor to the box (thus the
wallpaper) selectedbya computer.The rest of the taskproceeded in the same
way as the no-switch and other trials and no switchmanipulationwas intro-
duced during the computer trials.
Importantly, unknown to the participants, each computer trial oc-
curred shortly after each of the switch trials (specifically, the computer
trials always occurred on 6th, 12th, 17th, 22nd, and 25th trials) and, by
doing so, the computer’s choice automatically mimicked the partici-
pant’s choice made in a previous switch trial in terms of consistency
between their first preference rating and choice (note that more specifi-
cally, “choice” here refers to participant’s preference revealed at the stage
2 of the choice task). That is, suppose a participant was presented with
two images that were rated 5 and 7 on the 8-point scale during the first
preference rating task. Typically, they preferred the image with a higher
first rating (i.e., the one rated 7) during stage 2 of the choice task. How-
ever, because behavior is noisy, they would occasionally prefer the image
with a lower rating (i.e., the one rated 5) during the stage 2 of the choice
task. Because this behavior is known to contribute to an important arti-
fact (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma andMurayama, 2013), the computer
trials were programmed to select the image with a lower first rating
whenever the participant preferred (i.e., based on their action in the stage
2 of Fig. 1) the image with a lower first rating in a previous switch trial.
Similarly, the computer selected the imagewith a higher first rating when
the participant preferred the image with a higher first rating in a previous
switch trial. The order of no-switch and other trials was determined
randomly.
At the end of the choice task, each of the 30 images used in the switch,
no-switch, and computer trials was categorized into the six conditions
(five images each) depicted in Figure 1 (images A–F). Based on partici-
pant’s action during the stage 2 of the switch and no-switch trials, each
image was categorized as either “preferred” or “unpreferred.” Similarly,
based on participant’s final choice during the stage 4, each image was
categorized as either “chosen” or “unchosen.” Because of the switch
manipulation, preference and choice are inconsistent in the switch con-
dition (e.g., preferred-unchosen or unpreferred-chosen). Therefore, the
choice-blindness paradigm makes it possible to dissociate the effect of
choice from the effect of preference.
After the completion of the choice task, the participants were escorted
to the TMS room, where rTMS was administered as described below.
Immediately after rTMS, the participants were asked to perform the
second rating task in the TMS room. All participants started the task
within 2 min of the TMS completion.
The second rating task was similar to the first one, with the exception
that the images were now accompanied with information from the
choices the participants had made previously (as similarly done in the
previous fMRI study; Izuma et al., 2010). Below each image, they were
presented with the information about whether they (or a computer) had
chosen or unchosen the image during the choice task (e.g., “You chose
this picture,” “Computer rejected this picture,” etc.). For items in the
switch condition, this information was based on what participants be-
lieved to have chosen at the stage 4 of the choice task (Fig. 1). More
specifically, those images clicked on after the Flanker task in the stage 4
were accompanied with “You chose this picture,” whereas alternative
images were accompanied with “You rejected this picture.” This infor-
mation was intended to make the effect of cognitive dissonance stronger
by making the discrepancy between attitude and past behavior salient. It
should be noted that, because of the explicit information, preference
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change found in the present study should, if anything, be inflated. How-
ever, the aim of the present study is not to find aminimum condition for
choice-induced preference change to occur, but to test the effect of TMS
on pMFC when it does occur (see Salti et al., 2014, which formally tests
the effect of this explicit information). The participants were told that
this information about their past choices was related to a task they were
going to perform afterward, but not related to the rating task, and they
were asked to focus on reporting their preference for each image one
more time. As was the case in the first rating task, they rated the same 50
images using the 8-point scale.
After the second rating task, the participants were also asked to answer
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) questionnaire (10
items each for positive and negativemoods;Watson et al., 1988) using an
8-point scale to measure whether different rTMS conditions had differ-
ential effect on their mood. All participants finished the second rating
task and the PANAS questionnaire within 8 min after the TMS, presum-
ably well under the influence of the 25min rTMS (Bru¨ckner et al., 2013).
After completing the questionnaire, they took a 35–40 min break in the
original experimental room to ensure that the effects of the TMS had
subsided before continuing.
After the break, the participants completed the memory task. Impor-
tantly, thememory taskwas completely unanticipated by the participants
and they did not know that memory about their past choices would be
tested later on. During the task, they were presented images serially (as in
the first and second rating tasks) and were instructed to answer
whether they “chose” or “rejected” (i.e., unchosen) the item during
the choice task by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. They
were instructed that images presented in the computer trials of the
choice task would not be presented. Therefore, a total of 40 images
were presented during the task. Participants were also asked to make
best guess if they were not certain.
The memory task was intended to test whether the rTMS had any
differential effect on the participants’ ability to retrieve memory about
their past choices. Although, during the second rating task, the partici-
pants’ past choice for each presented imagewas displayed explicitly, if the
participants were able to remember their (correct) indicated preferences
in the switch trials, then the intended effect of cognitive dissonance in-
duced by discrepancy between behavior and attitude would have been
likely been reduced. It should be noted that, during thememory task, the
correct response was defined based on participants’ action at the stage 2
of the choice task. Accordingly, if the switchmanipulationwas successful,
and participants believed the explicit information about their past choice
during the second rating task, memory performance for the switch con-
dition should be lower than that for the no-
switch condition (i.e., they mistakenly
remembered that they chose the item that they
actually did not prefer at the stage 2 due to the
switch manipulation).
After finishing the memory task, partici-
pants were asked to complete the Preference
for Consistency Scale (Cialdini et al., 1995) us-
ing an 8-point scale. This 18-item scale was in-
tended to measure individuals’ disposition to
perceive themselves as predictable, stable, and
thus consistent (e.g., “it is important tome that
my actions are consistent with my beliefs”).
Finally, as similarly done in the original
choice-blindness study (Johansson et al.,
2008), the participantswere asked the three fol-
lowing questions during the postexperimental
interview to ensure that they did not detect our
critical switch manipulation: (1) “do you have
any comments on the experiment?,” (2) “do
you find anything strange with the wallpaper
stimuli during the tasks?,” and (3) “some par-
ticipants mentioned that, during some trials of
the choice task, the locations of two images
changed, do you think it happened to you?”
The three questions were asked always in this
order of increasing specificity. Four partici-
pants reported in response to the last question that the switch happened
to them also, so they were excluded from the analyses. The remaining
participants showed no sign of detection.
TMS procedures
To downregulate the activity in pMFC, we used 1 Hz rTMS, a noninva-
sive technique that can produce after-effects on cortical excitability, and
a low frequency (e.g., 1 Hz) rTMS known to decrease cortical excitability
in stimulated areas (Ridding and Rothwell, 2007). Each participant re-
ceived 1Hz rTMS for 25min. According to previous reports (Bru¨ckner et
al., 2013), the after effect of the 25min 1Hz rTMS is considered to last 20
min or more. A Magstim Super Rapid with a 70 mm air-cooled figure-8
coil was used.
The experimenter administering TMS was blind to the task and study
design except for knowledge of the three stimulation conditions and was
in the same room as the participants only during the TMS phase and an
initial portion of the second rating task. The experimenter administering
the participants’ tasks was absent during TMS positioning and delivery
andwas not informed of the TMS condition until after the completion of
the experiment. Participants were blind to the study’s intent, but were
aware of the possibility that they could be receiving either real or sham
stimulation and that real stimulationwould be expected to lower the level
of brain activity in the area under the coil for up to 30 minutes after the
end of stimulation.
The intensity of the TMS was set for each participant at 80% of the
participant’s active motor threshold. To determine threshold, we first
adjusted the TMS coil location and orientation to maximize the EMG
magnitude in tibialis anterior from single pulse stimulation. The partic-
ipant was then asked to steadily contract the muscle with moderate in-
tensity. Starting from 50% output, the stimulator was adjusted in 5%
steps to find the minimum intensity at which single-pulse TMS elicited a
liminal EMG for 3 of 4 stimuli. Themain rTMS treatment was conducted
at 80% of this value.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three TMS groups: (1)
pMFC, (2) sham-pMFC, and (3) PPC. Based on previous fMRI studies
(Izuma et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013), the pMFC target region
was determined as one-third of the distance fromnasion to inion (i.e., the
region approximately corresponding to the areas commonly activated in
our two previous fMRI studies) and the control (PPC) region was deter-
mined as two-thirds of the same distance (Harmer et al., 2001; Fig. 2).
Because activations found in the previous fMRI studies were slightly
stronger in the right hemisphere (Izuma et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs,
Figure 2. The location of rTMS target sites. The pMFC target regionwas determined as one-third of the distance fromnasion to
inion and thePPC regionwasdeterminedas two-thirds of the samedistance. Our two simulated regions approximately correspond
to the MNI coordinates of x 10, y 48, z 70 (pMFC) and x 10, y76, z 85 (PPC).
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2013), both stimulation sites were offset to the right of the nasion-Cz-
inion midline by 1 cm. The TMS coil was positioned with handle point-
ing in the superior direction.During the 25min rTMS, participants in the
pMFC and sham-pMFC group were supine, whereas those in the PPC
group were prone. Sham-TMS was administered by tilting the coil 90
degrees off of the scalp so that no stimulation actually reached the cortex.
Coil orientation. TMS effects are maximized when the induced field is
perpendicular to the gyral pattern because this aligns the field with cor-
tical columns in the walls of the sulcus (Brasil-Neto et al., 1992; Mills et
al., 1992; Fox et al., 2004). Based on the gyral pattern in the area of
interest, we chose to orient the field parallel to the midline. Stimulation
polarity with respect to this line can modulate the effectiveness of stim-
ulation, but there is no preceding research that would indicate the opti-
mal polarity for this area or function. In addition, the stimulator is
biphasic, which makes polarity less critical (Brasil-Neto et al., 1992).
Therefore, we positioned the handle in the superior direction to mini-
mize the equipment’s obtrusiveness to the participant. It is possible that
the opposite orientation of the coil would have induced a stronger effect.
Adverse effects. TMS was well tolerated by most participants, who gen-
erally fell asleep during the main treatment. One participant, however,
experienced dizziness after receiving three shamand five real single-pulse
stimuli during the search for the site for stimulating tibialis anterior.
Dizziness declined, resolving after 2 min. The participant was exam-
ined by emergency medical technicians and released. Dizziness was at-
tributed to a combination of stress/anxiety of the experiment and
preexisting conditions of sleep deprivation and dehydration.
Data analyses
Our main analysis is based on the 2 (preference: preferred or unpre-
ferred)  2 (switch: switch or no switch)  3 (TMS group: pMFC,
sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed design with preference change (second
preference ratingsminus first preference ratings) as a dependent variable.
It should be noted that, in our choice-blindness paradigm, a choice-
induced preference change is indicated by a significant 2 (preference:
preferred or unpreferred) 2 (switch: switch or no switch) interaction.
This 2 2 interaction indicates that preference change depends on what
the participants believed about past choices that they had made previ-
ously. Regardless of their initial relative preferences of two images as
revealed in the stage 2 of the choice task (preferred or unpreferred; Fig. 1),
preferences for the images should increase when participants believe that
they had chosen the image (i.e., the preferred-no-switch condition and the
unpreferred-switch condition), whereas preferences for images should de-
creasewhen imageswere thought to have beenunchosen (i.e., the preferred-
switch condition and the unpreferred-no-switch condition).
Furthermore, to compute the size of the TMS effect on choice-induced
preference change and to investigate the correlation between individual
difference in choice-induced preference change and participant’s ten-
dency to prefer consistency, as measured by the preference for consis-
tency scale, we computed a single preference change score for each
participant as following: We computed the 2-way (preference switch)
interaction term, divided it by 2 to take an average of preference change
observed in the preferred and unpreferred conditions, and subtracted
preference change observed in the computer condition. This score rep-
resents the magnitude of preference change caused by choices partici-
pants themselvesmade.More specifically, a preference change (PC) score
was computed as follows:
	PCPreferred-No_switch PCPreferred-Switch) (PCUnpreferred-Switch
 PCUnpreferred-No_Switch)]/2 (PCComputer_Chosen PCComputer_unchosen

Results
Preference change
A 2 (preference: preferred or unpreferred) 2 (switch: switch or
no switch) 3 (TMSgroup: pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC)mixed
ANOVA revealed a significant 2-way preference switch inter-
action (F(1,49) 23.19, p 0.001). Importantly, it also revealed a
critical 3-way preference  switch  TMS group interaction
(F(2,49) 3.34, p 0.044; Fig. 3). No other significantmain effect
or interaction was found in the ANOVA (all p 0.082).
To further probe the significant three-way interaction, three
separate two-way (preference  choice) repeated-measures
ANOVAs were conducted for each TMS group. This revealed a
significant preference  choice interaction in the sham-pMFC
group (F(1,16) 16.36, p 0.001; Fig. 3b) and in the PPC group
(F(1,17) 7.73, p 0.013; Fig. 3c). As stated earlier, this two-way
interaction indicates the existence of choice-induced preference
change and indicates that preference change depends onwhat the
participants believed about past choices they had made previ-
ously regardless of their initial relative preferences of two images
(preferred or unpreferred). We further conducted two-sample t
tests comparing the switch and the no-switch conditions in each
of the preferred and unpreferred conditions for the sham-pMFC
and PPC groups. The results revealed that the difference between
the switch and no-switch conditions were all significant (p 
0.006) except for the unpreferred condition of the PPC group
(p 0.21). In contrast, the same 2-way interaction was not sig-
nificant for the pMFC group (F(1,16)  1.30, p  0.27, n.s.; Fig.
3a). Two-sample t tests comparing the switch and no-switch con-
ditions in each of the preferred and unpreferred conditions for
the pMFC group revealed that there was no significant difference
in both preferred and unpreferred conditions (p 0.45). There-
fore, rTMS to the pMFC region significantly reduced choice-
induced preference change.
To determine whether TMS had any effect on preference
change for the items presented in the computer condition, we
conducted 2 (computer’s choice: chosen or unchosen) 3 (TMS
Figure 3. Mean preference changes (second preference ratings minus first preference ratings) in the switch and no-switch conditions across the three TMS groups; (a) pMFC group, (b)
sham-pMFC group, and (c) PPC group. Error bars indicate the SEM. Note that “preferred” and “unpreferred” (x-axis) are based on participant’s relative preferences of paired images, which was
revealed during stage 2 of the choice task (Fig. 1).
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group) mixed ANOVA. It revealed a significant main effect of
computer’s choice (F(1,49)  7.65, p  0.008). However, a main
effect of TMS group and a 2-way interaction were not significant
(p 0.18), indicating that TMS had no influence on preference
change after choices made by the computer. As seen in Figure 4,
across all three TMS groups, participants’ preference for the
items chosen by computer decreased, whereas their preference
for the items unchosen by computer increased. This result seems
to suggest the existence of a significant regression-to-the-mean
effect. Because the computer’s choice was matched with partici-
pant’s choice made in the switch condition, the items chosen by
the computer were more likely to have higher first preference
ratings. Accordingly, participant’s preference rating for the items
chosen by the computer is more likely to decrease during the
second rating task due to the regression-to-the-mean effect com-
pared with the items unchosen by computer.
Effect size analysis
To compute the size of the TMS effect on choice-induced prefer-
ence change, we computed a single preference change score as
described in Materials and Methods. One-way ANOVA on this
score comparing across the three TMS groups revealed amargin-
ally significant effect of TMS (F(2,49) 2.56, p 0.088). Because
there was no significant difference in mean preference change
scores between two control conditions (the sham-pMFC and
PPC groups, p 0.28), we combined these two control groups to
calculate Cohen’s d. A two-sample t test comparing the pMFC
group with this combined control group revealed a significant
difference (t(50) 1.93, p 0.03) and the calculation of Cohen’s
d revealed a moderate effect size of the TMS (d 0.59).
Control analyses
We investigatedwhether the rTMShad any effect on participants’
general attention level as indexed by reaction times (RTs) during
the first and second rating tasks, mood as measured by PANAS,
and memory about past choices.
A 2 (rating task: first or second)  3 (TMS group) mixed
ANOVA on RTs revealed no significant main effects or interac-
tion (p 0.15), suggesting that the rTMS did not affect partici-
pants’ attention level during the second rating task, which they
performed immediately after the rTMS. Regardless of the TMS
groups, the averag RTs (including all 50 trials) during the first
rating task was 2.17 s (SD 0.80), whereas the average RT during
the second rating task was 2.07 s (SD 0.70).
Two 1  3 (TMS group) ANOVAs on positive and negative
mood of the PANAS score revealed no significant effect of the
rTMS (p 0.34), indicating that the rTMS did not alter partici-
pants’ mood.
A 2 (switch: switch or no-switch)  3 (TMS group) mixed
ANOVA on memory about past choices revealed a significant
main effect of the switchmanipulation (F(1,49) 4.14, p 0.047).
Because, in the switch condition, the participants were led to
believe that they chose the image they preferred less than the
alternatives, theirmemory performances were significantly lower
than those in the no-switch condition. Regardless of the TMS
group, average memory performance of the no-switch condition
was 58.5% (SD 13.6), which was significantly higher than the
chance level (50%; t(51)  4.48, p  0.001), whereas average
memory performance of the switch condition was 47.9% (SD
16.4), which did not differ significantly from the chance level
(p  0.36). This result suggests that our switch manipulation
was successful and that participants continued to believe that
they had chosen the images they actually preferred less than
alternatives and had not chosen the images that they preferred
more than alternatives. A main effect of the TMS group and a
2-way interaction were not significant (p  0.77), suggesting
that our main results reported above cannot be explained by
differential memory about past choices across the three TMS
groups.
Finally, we also investigated whether the within-pair rating
difference and the preference-choice consistency were success-
fully matched across the three experimental conditions (switch,
no-switch, and computer) during the choice task, as we intended.
First, average within-pair rating differences (all TMS group
combined, n 52) in the no-switch and switch conditions were
both 1.98, and it was 2.01 in the computer condition. A 3 (exper-
imental conditions: switch, no-switch, or computer)  3 (TMS
group: pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC)mixed ANOVA revealed no
significant main effects or interaction (p 0.19).
Second, participants generally chose images that had higher
first preference rating when they had a chance to make a choice
themselves (i.e., the switch and no-switch conditions). Themean
preference choice consistency (all TMS group combined, n 52)
in the no-switch condition was 62.9%, and it was 65.0% in the
switch condition and the computer condition (as previously de-
scribed, the preference choice consistency was matched between
these two conditions by the task program). A 3 (experimental
conditions: switch, no-switch, or computer)  3 (TMS group;
pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC)mixed ANOVA revealed no signif-
icant main effect or interaction (ps 0.66).
Together, these results indicate that the main findings re-
ported above is highly unlikely to be explained by the different
level of the artifact (Chen and Risen, 2010) across three TMS
groups.
Figure4. Meanpreference changes (secondpreference ratingsminus first preference ratings) in the computer condition across the three TMSgroups; (a) pMFCgroup, (b) sham-pMFCgroup, and
(c) PPC group. Error bars indicate SEM.
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Preference for consistency scale
Finally, we conducted 1  3 (TMS group) between-participant
ANOVA on the preference for consistency scale. It revealed no
significant effect (p 0.54), suggesting that individual difference
in the tendency to prefer consistency was no different across the
three TMS groups.
We also investigated, as exploratory analyses, whether partic-
ipants’ preference for consistency scores were related to their
level of choice-induced preference change separately for each
TMS group. We used the same single preference change score
described above to index an individual’s tendency to justify
choices they made. Although correlations in all 3 groups did not
reach statistical significance largely due to our limited sample
size, the sham-pMFC and PPC groups tended to show positive
correlation (sham-pMFC r(15) 0.27, p 0.15; PPC r(16) 0.32,
p 0.10). In contrast, correlation in the pMFC group was virtu-
ally zero (r(15) 0.03, p 0.46).
Discussion
The present study demonstrated that choice-induced preference
change was significantly reduced by TMS over the pMFC region
compared with the control conditions (TMS to the PPC region
and sham-TMS to the pMFC region), providing the evidence that
the pMFC plays a causal role in inducing preference change after
inconsistency between choice and preference. It is important to
note that we used a modified choice-blindness paradigm to con-
trol for the artifact inherent in the traditional free-choice para-
digm (Chen and Risen, 2010). Therefore, unlike a number of
previous behavioral and neuroimaging studies that used the orig-
inal paradigm (Izuma and Murayama, 2013), the present study
provides unequivocal evidence for the existence of choice-
induced preference change and the effect of TMS over different
brain regions on the phenomenon.
The present findings are consistent with previous studies
showing that the pMFC plays a causal role in inducing behavioral
or attitude change after a variety of aversive experiences in both
social and nonsocial contexts. The pMFC is known to be acti-
vated by a variety of aversive outcomes (Shackman et al., 2011).
Furthermore, some neurons in pMFC do not simply respond to
negative outcomes per se, rather, these neurons respond to neg-
ative outcome (e.g., reduced reward) only when themonkey sub-
sequently changed their behavior from the previous trial (Shima
andTanji, 1998). There exist similar neurons in the humandorsal
anterior cingulate regions and ablation of this area significantly
impaired participants’ performance in a reward-based move-
ment selection task, especially when they had to change their
movement after reduced reward (Williams et al., 2004). Recently,
fMRI studies found that the same region is activated by aversive
experiences in social contexts (for review, see Izuma, 2013), such
as disagreeing with others (Klucharev et al., 2009; Izuma and
Adolphs, 2013) or agreeing with people we dislike (Izuma and
Adolphs, 2013). Furthermore, Klucharev et al. (2011) demon-
strated that TMS to the pMFC region significantly decreased in-
dividual’s tendency to conform to others’ opinions. Therefore,
just like its known role for nonsocial situations (Williams et al.,
2004), the pMFC plays a key role not only in detecting a social
situation that requires some level of adjustment in behavior or
attitude (such as cognitive dissonance, disagreeing with others,
etc.), but also in actually inducing that change.
It is important to note that preference change after cognitive
dissonance requires at least two processes: detection of discrep-
ancy (conflict) and subsequent implementation of conflict reso-
lution. The present study does not allow us to specify the exact
role played by pMFC. The pMFC could play a role in conflict
detection, conflict resolution, or both. Two past TMS studies on
response-level conflict showed that pre-SMA plays a causal role
in conflict resolution rather than conflict detection (Mars et al.,
2009; Soutschek et al., 2013) and it will be an important future
direction to investigate whether the pMFC plays a similar causal
role in resolving (rather than simply detecting) cognitive conflict
such as cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, two past studies
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2008b; Mengarelli et al., 2013) suggested
that left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) plays a causal
role in the resolution of cognitive dissonance, part of a larger
literature from neuroimaging studies that have found correla-
tional evidence for this brain region’s role in cognitive dissonance
processes (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008a; Harmon-Jones et al.,
2008b; van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010). It was further
demonstrated that the DLPFC specifically in left hemisphere plays a
causal role in choice-induced preference change (Harmon-Jones et
al., 2008b; Mengarelli et al., 2013). An EEG study found that,
when an individual’s left DLPFC activity was decreased through
neurofeedback training, choice-induced preference change was
reduced significantly (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008b). Conceptu-
ally similar results have been reported by a study using transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS; Mengarelli et al., 2013).
That study showed that choice-induced preference change was
significantly reduced after individual’s left DLPFC was stimu-
lated by cathodal tDCS, which is known to reduce the excitability
of the target areas. However, another EEG study (Harmon-Jones
et al., 2011) suggests that the DLPFC is not related to cognitive
dissonance per se and the commitment to the chosen course of
actions can increase the left DLPFC activity regardless of the ex-
istence of inconsistency between attitude and actions. Because
the DLPFC is known to be involved in cognitive control (Miller
and Cohen, 2001), the studies seem to suggest that the actual
implementation of choice justification requires general cognitive
control processes.
Although this neuralmodel of a discrepancy (dissonance) res-
olution system is similar to the model of response level conflict
resolution (Mansouri et al., 2009), it is probably too simplistic to
argue that they share the common neural mechanisms. For ex-
ample, our previous study (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013) showed
that the pMFC region activated by cognitive imbalance, which is
conceptually similar to cognitive dissonance (Abelson et al.,
1968; Gawronski and Strack, 2012), does not overlap with the
region activated by response conflict. The region activated by
response conflict was located more posteriorly (i.e., pre-SMA;
Izuma and Adolphs, 2013), consistent with two previous TMS
studies (Mars et al., 2009; Soutschek et al., 2013) demonstrating
that stimulating pre-SMA disrupts response conflict resolution.
Although the lack of anatomical resolution in the present study
does not allow us to specify the exact location stimulated by TMS,
our pMFC target region approximately corresponds to x  10,
y 48, z 70 (Jurcak et al., 2005), which is more anterior than
the previous studies: y 18 (Mars et al., 2009) and y 21 (Sout-
schek et al., 2013). As previously discussed (Izuma and Adolphs,
2013), we believe that the neural mechanism of a discrepancy
resolution systemmay be similar to that of behavioral adjustment
after an aversive outcome. Previously, we found that the areas
activated by cognitive imbalance largely overlapped with the
areas activated by aversive outcome (posterior dmPFC; Izuma
and Adolphs, 2013). This functional distinction within pMFC
is consistent with what has been suggested previously (Rid-
derinkhof et al., 2004; Rushworth et al., 2004; Hikosaka and
Isoda, 2010). Furthermore, other additional regions, such as
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the insula, seem to play a role in processing social types of
conflict (Klucharev et al., 2009; van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et
al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). Comparisons between
these multiple systems for resolving discrepancies between ex-
pectations and outcomes should be investigated further in
future research.
It should be noted that the preference change observed in the
present study could be explained by self-perception theory (Bem,
1967), which posits that, just as we come to know another per-
son’s preference by observing their behavior, we infer our own
preference by observing our own behavior (e.g., I must like it
because I chose it). This limitation is inherent in all past studies
demonstrating choice-induced preference change. Greenwald
(1975, 2012) even argued that these two theories cannot be dis-
tinguished. Although not conclusive, our present TMS study,
along with the previous fMRI study (Izuma et al., 2010), seem to
support cognitive dissonance theory. In our previous fMRI study,
the degree of cognitive dissonance was quantified as the discrep-
ancy between a participant’s past choice and preference for the
item and we found that activity in the pMFC correlated with this
parameter. Because this parameter is irrelevant to self-perception
theory, being able to reduce choice-induced preference change by
stimulating the pMFCwith TMS suggests that dissonance reduc-
tion processes played amajor role in the present study. However,
we admit that the fact that our data are consistent with one theory
does not necessarilymean that the other theory plays no role (i.e.,
consistency fallacy). Nonetheless, the present study highlights the
potential of cognitive neurosciencemethods (fMRI, TMS) in dis-
tinguishing two social psychological theories. For example, we
can test whether different brain regions are activated by psycho-
logical processes assumed in cognitive dissonance theory versus
self-perception theory. If activated regions are reliably different,
we can further test whether TMS to those regions could reduce
choice-induced preference change.
In summary, the present study demonstrated that TMS to the
pMFC could reduce choice-induced preference change. Our re-
sults inform neural models of the choice justification processes
implemented by the pMFC and provide a clear demonstration of
the causal role of the pMFC. It will be most important in future
studies to sharpen our understanding of this causal role by pro-
viding direct comparisons among different types of conflict and
to link the role of the pMFC to that of other brain regions with
which it is connected.
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